6/5/2019: The "Vertical Airstrip"

I NEED YOUR HELP ON THIS ONE:
In a section of my book, “A Spear Carrier in Viet Nam,” entitled “Short Flights on Dubious Airlines,” I describe a visit to Vientiane, Laos (via Royal Air Lao!), largely to see the structure in the photo below. I say “largely,” because by 1972, you couldn’t go outside the capital, and there wasn’t much to see inside it.
The photo, taken by me, is of a substantial (for SE Asia) arch then in “downtown” Vientiane. I have no idea if it is still there. Note that while it was clearly built for vehicular traffic, the only person visible is walking.
Everyone in CORDS knew it as “The Vertical Airstrip.” So did the Lao cyclo drivers who took us there from our hotel; that’s all I had to tell them.
Its conventional-wisdom backstory was that, some time earlier, the U.S. had granted some money to build an airstrip somewhere out in the country to actually prosecute the war, but the Lao, rational and peace-loving people that they are, chose instead to spend the money on this impressive arch.
That was the CW, but anything as substantial as this had to have a more official story. Can anyone help me with this?

People did!  It’s still there, and its backstory is still uncertain.  It is known as the “Patuxai”.

People did! It’s still there, and its backstory is still uncertain. It is known as the “Patuxai”.

5/17/2019: Weapons of the "Other War" in Viet Nam

If your goal is to win their hearts and minds, the quickest route is through their stomachs. Food was a major weapon of “the other war.” The two photos below demonstrate the process: Americans give the food to a local Vietnamese leader (in this case a Protestant pastor), who then hands it out to his parishioners. Both photos taken by me near DaNang, in 1967. I believe that the American in the first photo was named Joe Langlois. If anyone can confirm that (or correct me), please let me know.
Most of the food we distributed came through P.L. (Public Law) 480, commonly known as “Food for Peace.” I helped to distribute substantial quantities of the stuff during my times in country.
“Food for Peace” had three basic commodities; two strikeouts and a home run. The strikeouts were Bulgur Wheat, a partially processed grain, and CSM, a thoroughly processed blend of corn, soy and milk. The home run was vegetable oil (in the metal cans), because everybody needed to cook.
Sending massive amounts of wheat and corn to feed the people of a rice culture definitely benefited American farmers far more than the recipients, but that was a primary motive of the program. The Vietnamese considered both Bulgar Wheat and CSM to be little better than pig food, but vegetable oil was hugely valuable. The respective prices these commodities fetched on the local black market reflected this dichotomy.
I have much more to say about “Food for Peace” in my book “A Spear Carrier in Viet Nam,” available on Amazon, including my interaction an American general who wanted to put Bulgur Wheat on the General Officers’ Mess at MACV headquarters!

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5/6/2019: A Souvenir from 1967

A new photo (by me) of an old souvenir. My father gave this to me at the end of my 1967 summer in Viet Nam. I had been working as a volunteer for the World Relief Commission, distributing relief commodities to Protestant congregations in I and II Corps. He was a civilian, the CORDS Chief Education Advisor for I Corps. The marble comes from “Marble Mountain” near Da Nang. These were readily available for customizing in the local markets.

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4/22/2019: A Major Player in the Drama

On occasion, even a Spear Carrier finds himself close to a major player in the drama. But it’s deceptive; you aren’t in the script, so you are just watching from a closer distance.
This photo was taken by me at Dalat during my summer 1967 volunteer work in Viet Nam for the World Relief Commission. I had made a delivery, and was at the airport hoping to catch a plane ride—Air America or military, it made no difference—back to Da Nang, when I saw a Volpar land nearby.
The white-haired man descending from the Volpar is Ellsworth Bunker, Ambassador to the Republic of Viet Nam from 1967 to 1973. I am uncertain whether the woman in the brown dress in front of him is his wife, Carol Laise, who was then U.S. Ambassador to Nepal. Dalat was a popular get-away location for both GVN/ARVN and U.S. officials.

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4/12/2019: What Is A "Spear Carrier"?

My VN memoir is entitled, “A Spear Carrier in Viet Nam.” What do I mean by “Spear Carrier”? He’s someone who has a place on stage in a big production, but way in the back. He’s just there to fill out the cast; he has no lines in the drama. That’s how I felt in country, pretty much all the time. I suspect most of you did too.
Here’s an example of what I mean: the two photos are of a big ceremony in Lam Dong Province, 1970, handing over motorized cultivators to Vietnamese farmers. The American in the first photo congratulating a lucky farmer is none other than William Colby, then the DEPCORDS (Gen. Abrams’ Deputy for CORDS), in charge of the entire Pacification Program in Viet Nam, and later Director of the CIA. The second photo is of the same ceremony, with me in the left rear trying to look inconspicuous, as I had no part to play, nor lines to utter.
I don’t remember who took the photos.

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3/19/2018: For Me, It's Personal

This is my second post about the enormous tragedy that the U.S. brought upon Cambodia by sponsoring the 1970 coup. My previous post recounted how “ethnic cleansing” followed the coup, dropping Cambodia’s Vietnamese population by more than two thirds within five months. Some 200,000 of these were forcibly sent to Viet Nam, and the 10,000 sent to Bao Loc, Lam Dong Province, saw me amidst the local Vietnamese extending a welcome and aid.

About a year later, I was on a TDY in Phuoc Tuy Province, advising the relocation of Vietnamese from the long-fought-over areas just south of the DMZ. While driving along a road that led to Vung Tau, I repeatedly saw two long lines of young men, all in identical bush-colored shirts, shorts and hats, and each carrying a rifle. They were not Vietnamese; they were Cambodians, being trained to join the existing cannon fodder in a cause that was hopeless from the start. I’m sure that every one of them was dead within a few years, if not months.

Nigh on fifty years later, it is this memory—of two rows of young men walking down both sides of the road, as far as my eyes could see—that remains the most vivid of them all in my mind. That’s because it has become more than just a memory; it has come to symbolize the whole bloody disaster that was our lot and our legacy.

How odd that I should find the symbol of all the useless, pointless death and suffering brought about by our involvement in Southeast Asia among Cambodians, not Vietnamese. My encounters with Vietnamese were extensive and prolonged (and usually conducted in their language), while the Cambodians were just “there” a few times. The Cambodians I encountered had no individuality; they were just young, smiling faces with flashing teeth, whom I passed by quickly, never stopping. Then one day they weren’t there anymore.

For me, these young men filling my windows on each side as I drove by symbolize the larger picture that we as individuals so often ignore: so many men—and uncounted women and children— on all sides, all sacrificed to myths, and all ultimately betrayed. Vietnamese, Americans, Cambodians, Hmong and so many others, both those who believed and those who were given no choice, not to mention those who just found themselves in the wrong place at the wrong time. The list is both long and diverse, a twentieth-century tragedy.

So many lives lost, so much treasure expended, and we Americans can take responsibility for most of it.

I relate this brief experience, my work with Vietnamese suffering “ethnic cleansing,” and the occasional events of just plain weirdness that compromised my two times “in country” in “A Spear Carrier in Viet Nam; Memoir of an American Civilian in Country 1967, and 1970 – 72,” available from McFarland & Co. or Amazon, in either book or Kindle formats.

By the book’s end, you’ll understand why its final paragraphs deal with my hopes for the unpleasant fate of Henry Kissinger in his already-too-long-delayed afterlife.

Thank you for reading this.

3/11/2019: A Tragic Anniversary

This month marks the 49th anniversary of one of the most tragic mistakes made by the U.S. government in the twentieth century. I refer to U.S. support for the March 1970 coup that overthrew Cambodia’s Head of State, Prince Sihanouk. For me, it’s personal.

In the long term (after 1975), a huge price would be paid by the Cambodian people, who lost an estimated 25% of their population (some 1.8 million people) to “the Killing Fields.”

But in the short term, much of the price was paid by the Vietnamese residents (and citizens) of Cambodia. Anti-North Vietnamese sentiment was easily turned to a more general target, the local Vietnamese. The fact that they constituted much of the middle class in the cities made profit as much a motive as ethnic hatred.

What followed was what we call “ethnic cleansing” today, but we didn’t use the term back then. Cambodia’s Vietnamese population dropped from 450,000 to 140,000 within five months of the coup. Some 200,000 of them were forcibly repatriated to South Vietnam.

10,000 of these ended up in Bao Loc, Lam Dong Province, and were the reason I was sent to join MACV Team #38 there. I spent almost a year trying to aid in their reception and resettlement. Like so many other aspects of the Viet Nam war, this project began with high hopes but fizzled out well short of success.

I tell the story in my book “A Spear Carrier in Viet Nam: Memoir of an American Civilian in Country 1967, and 1970 – 72,” available from McFarland & Co. or Amazon, in either paperback or Kindle formats.

In my next post, I will discuss my encounter with Cambodian men being trained in Viet Nam for Lon Nol’s army,

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1/16/2019: A Review of My Book

Justin Reed reviews my new book:
For those members who want a refreshing and alternative perspective on the conflict in Vietnam i would happily and highly recommend this book. The author spent several years "in country" and has published this outstanding memoir of his time there . As a civilian im pretty sure the emotional rollercoaster was pretty intense imagine not being able to fall back upon your training call in support and defend yourself with state of the art equipment should the need arise. Michael Tolle i salute your bravery and your efforts to do what you felt was right.

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1/1/2019: A Skewed Perspective

I recently shared an article on why the US lost the war in Viet Nam. I panned it, because, I believe, the article totally missed the central point of the war. Generalizing from the multitude of comments my post received, that misunderstanding is widely shared.

A huge majority of the responses tried to pin our loss on some portion of the U.S. leadership structure or the other. Regardless of which Americans you blame, such comments repeat the very mistake that I criticized the original article for.

The whole point of my post was that for us to focus solely on the American experience is only natural, but it greatly distorts the reality of the war. If we are going to discuss not just our personal experiences but also offer broad judgments about the war itself, we need to focus on that reality, and reject comforting, simplistic myths, because they are wrong.

The shared article takes an excessively American-centric view of the war, and is thus lousy history. We must not treat the Vietnamese as bystanders in their own war. They, not we, were what the war was about. Their war began long before we arrived, and didn’t end when we left.

The Viet Nam war was not ours to win or lose. Our goal was to establish a Republic of Viet Nam capable of defending itself. To that end we expended both lives and treasure. The RVN failed at that basic task, and so we—the United States, not the military—lost the war. To claim anything else requires, accepting one or more of those comforting, simplistic myths.

There is a difference between remembering what and understanding why. The latter requires a much broader focus, and is particularly difficult for those who actually have to do the remembering. But it’s our job as sentient human beings to not just remember, but to understand. Our post-Viet Nam war history says we have done a poor job of that.

We still get into fights we can’t win, because of our American-centric approach to the world. We have had men—and women--in Afghanistan for seventeen years now, propping up a corrupt and incompetent regime that lacks the support of its people. Sound familiar? Do you expect such a regime to survive after we leave? Should the generation of Afghan vets blame “politicians” who happen to be in office when the end inevitably comes? How about those who got us into the war decades ago?

Sometimes I think the Viet Nam war can be summarized as “Been there, done that, didn’t learn a thing.” But I’m going to keep trying anyway. Truth, not myths about the past, is necessary to deal with the present and to plan for the future.

Thanks to those who read this to the end. Peace, and a Happy New Year to all!

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12/30/2018: An Example of Lousy History

I'm sharing this article because it demonstrates how you can get your facts straight and still completely miss the point. It compares USARV to the VC/NVA, and does not ONCE mention the GVN, ARVN, or any other of the many forces we tried to build to establish an independent Republic of Viet Nam. Our failure in that effort lies at the root of "why we lost the VN war." The article is simply lousy history.

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12/3/2018: An Unsung Hero

The man in the photo below is one of the unsung heroes of the war in Viet Nam. He wasn’t a soldier, and he wasn’t even an American. He was a Canadian, who, after his retirement, volunteered with his wife to work in Viet Nam, spreading the word of God and trying to ameliorate some of the enormous suffering being inflicted on the Vietnamese. He and his wife lived modestly, and saw little return for their efforts. I was privileged to work for him during the summer of 1967.
Given the rules of publishing, when I wrote about him in my book, I had to use a pseudonym, and I deeply regret that. I want to take this opportunity to, using Facebook rules, tell everyone that his name was PETER WIWCHARUCK (pronounced “witch-rock”).
There weren’t many men—and women—like him in Viet Nam, and the task they faced was insurmountable. They were widespread but tight knit, and it was also my privilege to meet a few others, however briefly.
Peter Wiwcharuck and those like him deserve to be more remembered.

VN Peter Wiwcharuck in C47 at DaLat.jpg